Network Partition
SEV-2, Significant ImpactFan-Out propagation · network · Affects 1 scenario(s)
Severity Classification
Classified as CRITICAL based on failure mode severity. The fan out propagation pattern increases risk of broad impact beyond the initial failure point.
Propagation Chain
Origin component
Network Partition begins at the source component. Trigger: AWS availability zone network degradation or inter-AZ routing failure.
Immediate (T+0) · Signal: Error Rate Spike
Downstream dependents
Failure propagates to directly dependent components via synchronous calls or shared resources. Latency increases and error rates rise on affected dependencies.
Connection refused or timeout errors surface immediately, within seconds. Cluster coordination systems detect node unreachability within their configured failure detection window (typically 5 to 30 seconds). Application-level health checks typically catch it within 10 to 60 seconds. · Signal: Latency spike, connection timeout, or error rate increase on dependents
Downstream of dependents (fan-out)
Failure spreads to multiple downstream systems simultaneously. Retry storms may amplify load on the failing component.
Within minutes of initial failure · Signal: Multiple services reporting elevated error rates
Blast Radius
Every cross-partition service call fails for the duration. CP systems stop accepting writes (and current reads) from the minority side; AP systems keep serving but accumulate divergence that must be resolved later. Coordination services (etcd, ZooKeeper) losing quorum during a partition cascades to every service that depends on them for configuration or leader election, turning a network event into a wide application outage even for services with no direct network problem of their own.
Contributing Factors
This operational trigger enables Network Partition: AWS availability zone network degradation or inter-AZ routing failure
This operational trigger enables Network Partition: Firewall rule change blocking inter-node communication
This operational trigger enables Network Partition: Network equipment failure on a cross-datacenter link
Remediation Plan
Identify partition scope: which nodes cannot reach which? Check network connectivity between AZs
Effort: Minutes to hours (on-call response)
Check cluster membership (etcd member list, Kafka broker metadata): do members see each other?
Effort: Minutes to hours (on-call response)
For CP systems: confirm the majority side is functional; the minority will stay unavailable until the partition heals
Effort: Minutes to hours (on-call response)
Send writes only to the primary AZ; serve reads from any AZ. On partition, the primary AZ keeps accepting writes at the cost of reads from the isolated AZ going stale or unavailable. AZ-aware load balancing (Kubernetes topology spread constraints) supports this routing.
Effort: 1 day to 1 week
A quorum-based consensus system can only elect a leader with majority agreement, so a partition minority cannot independently elect one and stops accepting writes. etcd, CockroachDB, and Kafka in KRaft mode implement this correctly; the specific failure this prevents, and what happens without it, is detailed in split_brain.
Effort: 1 day to 1 week
Inject network partitions in staging with tc netem or a chaos engineering tool (Chaos Monkey, Chaos Mesh) and verify the system behaves as designed: CP systems stop writes on the minority side, AP systems converge correctly once the partition heals.
Effort: 1 day to 1 week
Configure alerts for: error rate spike, replication lag, alert. Set thresholds to fire at 70% of critical level to allow response before full failure.
Effort: 1–3 days
Coordination state and financial data need CP; user activity feeds and analytics can tolerate AP. The cost of CP is minority-side unavailability during a partition; the cost of AP is divergence that must be resolved after. Pick per data store based on which cost is acceptable for that data, rather than accepting whatever a chosen technology defaults to.
Effort: 1–4 sprints
This post-mortem framework is derived from structured architecture knowledge. It provides an evidence-grounded starting point, not a substitute for a live incident review conducted by the team closest to the system. Adjust remediation priorities based on actual runtime observations.